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TORTS
Immunity of Parent from Suit by Child Does Not Extend
to Estate of Deceased Parent
Recently, an unemancipated, minor plaintiff sued to recover
damages from her mother's estate for personal injuries sustained
while riding as a passenger in a car driven by her mother. Due
to the negligent operation of the automobile, the vehicle collided
with a truck, killing the mother instantly. The trial court applied
the general rule "that unemancipated, minor child cannot recover
against the parent when the action is based upon negligence."
The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the trial court, holding
that the doctrine of interfamily immunity does not extend to the
estate of a deceased parent.'
The doctrine of interfamily immunity was first announced
in 1891,2 and has been followed in almost every American jurisdiction.3 The courts have permitted some exceptions to the
general rule when there has been a separate and distinct relationship in addition to that of parent and child, 4 or where the
tort was intentional, aggravated or brutal. 5 The major justification for the doctrine is that courts should do nothing that would
interfere with domestic tranquillity or parental discipline. Where
the courts have allowed exceptions to the general rule, it has
lBrermecke v. Kilpatrick, Mo. Supp., 336 S.W. 2d 68 (1960).
2

Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).

3

Annot., 19 A.L.R. 2d 425 (1951).

4

See Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (1908) (master
and servant); accord, Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930)
(master and servant); Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E. 2d 343
(1939) (parent owner of a common carrier); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va.
17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932) (parent operator of a common carrier). In these
cases insurance was a key factor.

5

See Chastain v. Chastain, 50 Ga. App. 241, 177 S.E. 828 (1934)
and battery); Meyer v. Ritterbush, 196 Misc. 551, 92 N.Y.S.
(1949), affirned, 276 App. Div. 972, 94 N.Y.S. 2d 620
(murder); Hewelette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891)
imprisonment); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Or. 282, 218 P. 2d 545
(defamation); contra, Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788
(rape).
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been because there was no chance of disrupting the family relationship if recovery were permitted.6 Despite these noteworthy
exceptions a cause of action has been denied when the parent
was deceased at the time of the trial. 7 The courts maintain that
the right of the child to sue should be determined by the status of
the relationship of parent and child at the time the alleged cause
of action arose and not at the time of the trial. 8 In the instant
case the Missouri Court by a needless interpretion of their Survival Statutes,9 held "there was a cause of action in being to
survive."10 Previously, the same court had ruled that the failure
of a member of a family to recover was due to a procedural disability to sue rather than an absence of a substantive cause of
action for negligence." 'This disability is not absolute and the
cause of action otherwise existing may be asserted, if the reasons
for its denial are no longer in existence. '12 The court relied
heavily on Hamilton v. Fulkerson3 in which it had permitted a
wife to recover against a husband for an antenuptial tort on
similar reasoning. The basis for that decision was that according
to the Survival Statutes, "Causes of action for personal injuries
... shall not abate by reason of the death of the person against
whom such cause of action shall have accrued."' 4
By analogy the court applied the same principles to the instant
case in regard to the parent and child relationship. Since the
cause of action had accrued, and since the procedural disability
to sue had vanished with the death of the parent, the court held
15
the plaintiff had a cause of action.
6

Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905, 908 (1930).

7

Lasecki v. Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33 (1940); 39 Am. Jur. Parent
and Child #90 (1942).

8

Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425,40 N.E. 2d 236

(1942).

9

Ann. Mo. Stat. 537. 020 (Vernon, 1951).
OBrennecke v. Kilpatrick, Mo. Supp., 336 S.W. 2d 68, 72 (1960).

1

IlEnnis v. Truhitte, Mo. Supp., 306 S.W. 2d 549 (1957).
12 Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, Mo. Supp., 336 S.W. 2d 68, 73 (1960).
13

Mo. Supp., 285 S.W. 2d 642 (1955).
14Ann. Mo. Stat. 537. 020 (Vernon, 1951).
15

Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, Mo. Supp., 336 S.W. 2d 68, 73 (1960).
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It is submitted that the mental gymnastics of the court to
justify their position were unnecessary. It is obvious that if the
parent is deceased, the danger of disrupting family unity or subverting parental discipline is nil. When the reason for the rule
ceases, the rule itself should cease.
The court expressly stated that "the presence of insurance is
immaterial to any issue in the case..."16 Despite this language,
it seems dubious that any court would fail to be conscious of the
significance of insurance in this type of action with the universal
awareness of insurance in contemporary American life. Many
modem textwriters criticize the doctrine of interfamily immunity
on this basis.
Since the defendant will not have to pay out of his own
pocket, it is obvious that the family exchequer will not be
diminished and that domestic harmony will not be disrupted
by allowing the action as by denying it.17
It is conceded that such a suit may encourage collusion between the parent and child, and therefore the repudiation of the
strict interfamily immunity rule should be accompanied by a
careful scrutiny of the bona fides of the plaintiff's cause of action.
Nevertheless, in cases where the negligent parent is dead or
where the injury inflicted is intentional, domestic tranquility
would seem to be an inappropriate reason for denying recovery. 8
There is little authority in Virginia on the narrow issue of this
case. Recently, an unemancipated infant was denied a recovery
against a living parent.1 9 In Worrell v. Worrel2 ° a state statute
requiring all common carriers to carry liability insurance was held
to be enough to extend the right of action to the daughter of an
owner of a common carrier, but the court distinguished between
this type of situation and the typical case of negligence on the
16jbid.

17Prosser, TORTS, 677-8 (2d ed., 1955).
l8McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARV. L. REV.
1077-1081 (1930).
19

Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 74 S.E. 2d 170 (1953).
20174 Va. 11, 74 S.E. 2d 170 (1939).
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1RECENT CASES

part of a parent who carries liability insurance.2 1 Here the rela-

tionship of parent and child was incidental, the negligence of the
father was derived through his agent, the driver of the common
carrier, and the insurance carried by the father was compulsory
whereas in the typical case the relationship would not be changed:
the negligence of the father would be direct, and liability insurance would be voluntary. In the field of workmans compensation recovery has been allowed not because the action is one to
recover damages for a wrong but rather because liability is predicated on the employment relationship.2 The Married Woman s
ActO which gives a wife the right to have a separate estate, make
contracts in her own name, and which precludes the husband
from being liable on the contracts of his wife has been interpreted
to mean that one spouse may be liable to the other for damage
to the latter's property.24 But this does not extend to actions for
personal torts.P There has been some statutory limitation on the
doctrine of interfamily immunity, but it must be noted that the
restrictions are based on an additional and distinct relationship
besides that of parent and child or husband and wife, and there
has been no attempt to destroy the fundamental immunity from
personal actions. It should be recognized that while the Virginia
courts have permitted these exceptions to the general rule, they
have shown no inclination to go further and have at every opportunity reaffirmed the general principle of interfamily immunity.
A.H.H.
21Norfolk Southern v. Gretalds, 162 Va. 597, 174 S.E. 841 (1934).
22

Glassco v. Glassco, 195 Va. 239, 77 S.E. 2d 843 (1953).

23

Va. Code Ann. §§ 55-35, 55-36, 55-37 (Repl. vol., 1959).

24

Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 197 Va. 216, 89 S.E. 2d 69 (1955).

25

Keister's Adm'rs v. Keister's Exors, 123 Va. 157, 96 S.E. 315 (1919); Furey
v. Furey, 193 Va. 727, 71 S.E. 2d 191 (1951).

